This essay is a belated response to a question posed by Jay Fliegelman about object culture and thinghood in the U.S. For their responses to previous versions of the argument, there are audiences I should thank, and individuals I'll thank here:
Ontologies Things quicken.
What you took to be the inanimate object-world slowly but certainly wakes.
Signs of new life can be read at a glance-in the titles of essays, exhibitions, and books.
The Tears of Things, Things That Talk, Ideas in Things, "The Secret Life of Things."
1 The titles alone perform some anthropomorphizing work. The titles mark an underacknowledged postmodernity: the confusion of object and subject, animate and inert, overcoming what's known now, in the political philosophy of science, as modernity's artificial distinction between persons and things.
2 At the very least, objects promise to become, say, somewhat different objects of knowledge. (New York, 1987) , and Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (Baltimore, 1984) . Indeed Stewart, cited by Appadurai and other anthropologists, continues to have considerable influence beyond literary studies.
6. Whereas Appadurai and the contributors to his volume use the verb commoditize and the noun commoditization, I've reverted (unless quoting) to commodify and commodification. The slight semantic loss is, I think, compensated for by the aural gain.
"Why has it taken us so long," Annette Weiner asked (speaking to the American Ethnological Society in 1993), "to move beyond traditional, normative economic theories when as anthropologists we all acknowledge the complex and ambiguous nature of objects at the microethnographiclevel?"
3
Of course, the complex nature of objects would seem to have been a perennial topic for anthropologists, from Malinowski's 1922 account of the white conus armshells and red charma necklaces within the Kula trade ring of the Massim to, say, Nancy Munn's 1986 account of the exchange trajectory of Kula canoes among the Gawans.
4 But Arjun Appadurai, among others, considerably renewed and revised this engagement by proposing a kind of "methodological fetishism": a focus on the object exchanged rather than on the exchange system and its social functions. 5 The anthology he edited, The Social Life of Things (1986) , enlivened the study of objects (within and beyond the field), and one essay in that volume, Igor Kopytoff 's "The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process," illustrates the collection's point with particular clarity and with considerable audacity.
Like Appadurai and the other contributors, Kopytoff wants to establish a more complicated, extramercantile understanding of the commodification and circulation of objects, to insist that the commodification of an object involves a cognitive and cultural element;
6 he also emphasizes how 10. Appadurai, "Introduction," p. 3. Moreover, while an object's "social life" might be understood as its circulation, Kopytoff is interested in focusing attention on the object's biography outside of circulation-or outside the circulation mediated by commodity exchange.
11. See, for instance, Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers, "African 'Slavery' as an Institution of Marginality," Slavery in Africa: Historical the term biography so confidently and imagines "biographical possibilities" so clearly ("CB," p. 66), which he does by beginning his argument about the commodity-the object abstracted through commodification but subsequently individualized-with the example of the slave. However aberrant we take the commodification of humans to be, that process becomes exemplary of commodification itself, although the example shows how commodification, as an explanatory genre, never tells the whole story. Whereas Appadurai begins by writing of the "conceit that commodities, like persons, have social lives," Kopytoff begins with a literal instantiation of the trope.
10
Kopytoff, who works on slavery indigenous to Africa, describes how the slave has moved away "from the simple status of exchangeable commodity and toward that of a singular individual occupying a particular social and personal niche." His argument participates in the "shift away from [the] allor-none view" of the slave as exchangeable property and toward a "processural perspective" that discloses the ambiguous status of the slave, which underlies his or her social identity ("CB," p. 65).
11 Anyone familiar with The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African (1789) will concede that designating Equiano a slave discloses very little about him-about his circulation through various regions of the world and occupations in the world and his circulation in and out of slavery. Indeed, to describe Equiano as a commodity object alone would amount to effecting the very abstraction accomplished by commodification itself.
Although Kopytoff 's gambit, implicitly, is that we will not recognize the life of things without focusing on those things that have lives, he recognizes full well that "the conceptual distinction between the universe of people and the universe of objects" is axiomatic in the West, rooted in classical antiquity and Christianity, integral to European modernity ("CB," p. 84). Because this is an axiom by which his readers live their daily lives, he patiently points out not only that the "conceptual polarity of individual persons and commoditized things is recent and, culturally speaking, exceptional" but also that both the contemporary traffic in human organs and ova as well as debates over adoption and surrogate motherhood demonstrate that the boundary between person and thing may be more permeable than we're inclined to believe ("CB," p. 64; see pp. 84-87). Of course, the ethical chal- 14. Quoted in ibid., p. 30. "But one year later," as Genovese goes on to say, "we hear: 'A slave has volition, and has feelings which cannot be entirely disregarded'" (ibid). Saidiya V. Hartman has trenchantly summarized the parodoxical effects of the law's recognition of "slave personhood": "The weighing of person and property-the limited recognition of the slave as person, to the extent that it did not interfere with the full enjoyment of the slave as thingendowed the enslaved with limited protections and made them vulnerable to injury, precisely because the recognition of person and the calibration of subjectivity were consonant with the imperatives of the institution" (Saidiya V. lenges provoked by such permeability have their own history; the long-standing conceptual distinction between person and thing riddled the institution of slavery. As David Brion Davis explains, for Roman law it was generally "convenient to regard the slave as a res," but jurists also recognized that "the slave was both a person and a thing." 12 The contradictory legal status of the American slave-both human and thing-provoked obvious questions about the criminal culpability of slaves (which depended on granting them autonomy and agency) and of the slave holders' treatment of them (which depended on granting slaves some basic rights).
13 And yet, for instance, a Kentucky court ruled (in 1828) that "whether it be politic or impolitic, a slave by our code is not treated as a person, but (negotium) a thing."
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For Harriet Beecher Stowe, of course, this ontological confusion, regardless of whatever legal quandary it provoked, crystallized the moral horror of slavery; or, rather, the slippage between person and thing efficiently captioned the moral fact that the institution of slavery enacted an ontological scandal. Though the history of that scandal may be most apparent in the law, it casually informs all sorts of discursive acts. An advertisement for an estate sale in 1777 reads: PUBLICK AUCTION, At the house of the late Richard Colden, Esq., in Smith-Street, corner of King-Street, . . . the sale of all his neat and elegant household and kitchen furniture, consisting of mahogany desks and book cases, buroes, chest drawers, card, dining and dressing tables, beds and bedsteads, plate, china, an elegant Axminster carpet, etc. etc. A valuable iron chest, with a handy young negro girl, about 13 years old. Also, a neat riding Chair.
15
The "handy young negro girl," more implement than child, remains ontologically undifferentiated from the chest or chair. Stowe's original subtitle for Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852)-"The Man Who Was a Thing"-advertises such a scandal, fully dramatized by her depiction of the kind, loving, Chris- tian man who makes it clear, page after page, how human he is. Thus Stephen Best explains Stowe's understanding of the effect of slavery as "an everyday animism that cuts across the founding difference between persons and property"; 16 and thus Phil Fisher describes the sentimental work of the abolitionist novel as the work of "making a thing into a man."
17 In Kopytoff 's terms, the biographical dilemma suffered by any slave-the dilemma dramatized so poignantly by Stowe-is that the "singular individual" could become a commodity again, suddenly sold without warning, suffering the "social death," as Orlando Patterson termed it, that vitiates any social life of the American slave.
18 Indeed the status of the "singular individual"hardly makes ideological sense-not, at least, from a Lockean perspective-given the loss of self-determination.
19 This is one reason why slave narratives, to the degree that they foreground self-determination-say Douglass's work learning to read, his decision to battle Covey, his decision to speak and to write publicly-depict the very singular individuality that in itself (and regardless of any articulated plea) stages the crime of commodity homogenization.
Still, this ontological scandal does not depend on a slave economy-at least not according to Marx's conceptualization of the effects of capital. For the spectral completion of commodity fetishism (where things appear to have lives of their own) is human reification (where people appear to be no more than things). The point is not just that social relations appear to the producers as "material [dinglich] relations between persons and social relations between things" (the latter phrase inspiring Appadurai's title); the commodity form itself depends on "the conversion of things into persons and the conversion of persons into things . . . [Personifizierung der Sachen und Versachlichung der Personen]"; and the very fact that the worker is subject to the conditions of labor, rather than those conditions being subject to him, "entails the personification of things and the reification [Versachlichung] ployment of the ontological scandal effected by the institution-slaverywhich Marx understood to be upended by capitalism, depending as it does on the transformation of the value of labor-power into wages (see C, 3:121). Just as commodity fetishism unveils the persistence of a kind of enchantment in the modern world, so too reification discloses the invisible persistence of the ontological effects of slavery. And just as Kopytoff points out the incompleteness of slavery even during its institutionalization, so Marx suggests the ineliminability of slavery even after the institution has been abolished.
Of course, in its U.S. manifestation, the institution of slavery proved something of a historical conundrum for Marx. On the one hand, it was clear that the capitalist mode of production and its accompanying technology were the preconditions for abolishing slavery (as the British government did throughout the empire in 1833). In a passing comment about the incapacity of philosophy or theology to liberate man in The German Ideology, he insists that "slavery cannot be abolished without the steamengine and the mule and the spinning-jenny."
21 Likewise, the success of moral arguments against the institution appears as an epiphenomenon of the economic shift: "Slavery, on the basis of capitalist mode of production, is unjust" (C, 3:461). On the other hand, he was well aware that the difference between "patriarchal slavery" and the "plantation system" was the latter's focus beyond the household economy-its focus on a "world market" (C, 3:940). This is why he designates plantation owners as "anomalies" within that market (a market "based on free labour"). Despite the anomaly, though, "we now not only call the plantation owners in America capitalists, but [also] they are capitalists."
22 All told, the persistence of slavery-its persistence within capitalism and as constitutive of the capitalism of the American South-appeared as a denial of history.
However perplexing the slave-dependent mode of production proved to be within the history of capital, Marx too was certain about the ontological confusion perpetrated by the institution, in the ancient and in the modern American world, which he gleans from Frederick Law Olmsted's A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States (1856). Differentiated from the instrumentum mutum as the instrumentum vocale, the speaking instrument neglects and mistreats the mute instrument of his labor in order to "give himself the satisfaction of knowing that he is different," which is why slaves are provided with particularly rude and heavy tools, however inefficient (C, 1:303-4 n. 18). 23 The psychological point, however dubious, is that the proximity to things provokes the act of differentiating abuse toward things. (The completion of such psychology would address the abuse of slaves as a comparably differentiating act.)
24 It may be difficult to determine the place of slavery within economic history, but it is not difficult to sense the ambiguous personhood of the slave within, say, ontological history-that is, perceived from the purview of historical ontology.
Historical ontology, a concept developed by Foucault, now names a field of inquiry defined by Ian Hacking as, most generally, the study of the possibility of certain objects coming into being, which includes the historical study of the kinds of person it becomes possible to be: a pervert, a child, a homosexual, a heterosexual, a psychopath.
25 Within such a field (heuristically hijacked), even as we point to a certain moment in a certain place when and where it is no longer possible for a person to be a slave (to be someone else's property, to be [negotium] a thing), we nonetheless find, in the posthistory of that moment, residues of precisely that possibility-in other words, an ongoing record of the ontological effects of slavery, not marked by such terms as slave wages (which makes no ontological point), but fully elaborated in Marx's account of Versachlichung.
26 I myself want to draw attention to how such a residual ontology persists-figuratively or obliquely at times, at times theatrically-within material, visual, and literary culture. Although it is the history of science, psychology, and philosophy that have produced the groundbreaking work in historical ontology, "pop culture," as Hacking says, is "full of object-making, and there is a lot to be learned there." Modern and Pandora's Hope. I should add that Hacking seriously questions Latour's "intention to minimize the differences between the human and the nonhuman" (Hacking, Historical Ontology, p. 17). The historical ontologist concerns himself with charting the very distinction that Latour (among others) has worked to undo. In the future field one might designate extreme environmentalism, it would be only our capacity to think beyond the human/nonhuman, person/ thing binary that enables us to perpetuate the habitability of the globe. See Latour, Politics of Nature, chap. 2.
Which is where I am headed: not to trace the emergence of new kinds of persons it is possible to be (say, a hacker or a punk), but to bring these ontological residues into focus as, say, the incompleteness of history (what Habermas, in a different register, would call the incompleteness of Western modernity). The context for this, at the close of the twentieth century, not only included the climate of ambiguity and uncertainty of the sort prompted, as Kopytoff says, by the contemporary traffic in organs and ova, and so on; it also involved the posthumanism (in the anthropology of science, in feminism, in new media studies) that has made modernity's distinction between human subjects and inanimate objects appear increasingly artificial.
28 This would seem to be an auspicious moment for rethinking that binary within the political and material specificities of a U.S. context, which I would like to do not by tracking the biography of things but by considering, say, the ontology in things, by which I mean the historical ontology congealed within objects.
Cultural Archaeologies
How does such a history become visible? It becomes visible when an object becomes something else, emerges as a thing dislocated from the circuits of everyday life or singularized by the doting mediation of lyric or fiction or film, textualized (retroprojectively produced) in a microethnographic operation that (consciously or unconsciously, and no matter how realistic or fantastic) provides access to the complex and ambiguous nature of objects and to the cultures of objects whereby they become meaningful, or fail to.
As an example, let me take Spike Lee's Bamboozled, that controversial film, within a career of controversial films, that bombed at the box office in 2000 while thriving in the academy: the object of extensive analysis, political commentary, and debate. However provocative the politics of Lee's recirculation of the minstrel show and its black stereotypes (curiously hard to distinguish from his protagonist's reinvention of minstrelsy), I want to draw attention to those objects in the movie that are generally designated Sambo art, negro objects represent, in Patricia Turner's words, "one of the most deplorable and least well documented impulses in American consumer history," now provoking the kind of outrage provoked by the (well-documented) institution of blackface minstrelsy. 30 Whereas the minstrel show animates the stereotype of the "plantation darky," these objects might be said to deanimate it, to arrest the stereotype, to render it in three-dimensional stasis, to fix a demeaning and/or romanticizing racism with the fortitude of solid form. Different arguments have been made to explain the sudden popularity of these objects in the post-Reconstruction era. "Such objects of material culture," Kenneth Goings writes, "gave a tangible reality to the idea of racial inferiority. They were the props that helped reinforce the new racist ideology that emerged after Reconstruction."
31 Steve Dubin reads the objects as inverted totems, enhancing the solidarity of the white population through "the convenient identification of who was beyond" the social boundary.
32 They could be read, likewise, as fetishes-as the embodiment of a specific type of fetishism: as the memorializing disavowal of the sameness effected by universal male suffrage; as the defense against the knowledge that the equation of physical features and behavior makes no sense; as, most simply, the denial of history.
33 The fixity of the stereotype, rendered in ceramic or iron or aluminum, compensates for the new heterogeneity of black America; the nostalgic embodiment of some fantasmatic past compensates for uncertainties about the future place and role of African Americans in the U.S.
34 Of course, in this respect, these household objects participated in the nostalgic, late-nineteenth century romanticization of the plantation South, the literary version of which we find in Joel Chandler Harris's Nights with Uncle Remus (1883) and Thomas Nelson Page's In Ole Virginia (1887), for instance, and the theatrical version of which we find in the perpetuation of the minstrel show, notably in what Robert Toll takes to be the culmination of the black minstrel troupes' increasing use of plantation material. The Black America show, staged in Brooklyn's Ambrose Park in 1895, was a full-blown re-creation of slave life, featuring log cabins, spirituals, watermelons, cakewalks, and over five hundred "genuinely southern negroes," cheerfully enslaved.
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Thus, it might be simpler to argue that in a world without slavery these objects enabled their owners to possess and control miniaturized black faces and black bodies (in a world of "symbolic slavery," as Dubin calls it). As Turner contends, "they are about the ways in which even after the institution of slavery was over, American consumers found acceptable ways of buying and selling the souls of black folk."
36 In other words, it is possible 40. In the case of the banks, I understand them as a subset of the mechanical toys I've discussed before: "The automaton's segmented, repetitive movement reproduced, as a scene of delight, the rationalization of the worker at the site of production, affirming, within the realm of childhood amusement, the fragmenting rhythm of machine discipline and the automatization of the body. . . . But if the modern toy thus enacted the rhythm of modernity, it most often nostalgically represented traditional forms of entertainment-above all, circus and minstrel acts" ( to imagine consumer culture offering white Americans some fantasmatic perpetuation of the system that capitalist modernization had helped to undo. And, yet, the vast majority of these objects were produced in the North; there was a considerable European market for them; and manufacturers in Germany, France, and especially England found significant domestic markets for their own black objects. 37 Thus, the point might be, more precisely, that "by operating at the level of humor, satire, and caricature, these objects," as Jacqueline Najuma Stewart puts it, "support one fantasy of Blackness in the white imagination-that it is fixed, is visually familiar, and can be placed safely under white control."
38 The objects would seem to satisfy something other than the longing for slavery's persistence-perhaps no more than the longing for a simplicity and stability most conveniently achieved through the "synchronic essentialism" that arrests history.
39 The point is certainly not that the racist objects aren't racist but rather that the racism, serving as a means rather than an end, is especially pernicious. American racial typology proves to be a convenient way, throughout the West, of securing such allotemporal stability. At the same time, we might consider the objects as sites of projection, where the human condition within the capitalist mode of production-reification-becomes externalized and historicized: the condition of other people at another time.
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Bamboozled, though, characterizes and conceptualizes these objects very differently.
Within the film, the ambitious, pretentious, Harvard-educated Pierre Delacroix (Damon Wayans) suddenly succeeds as a television writer when he produces Man Tan and the New Millennium Minstrel Show, originally meant as a biting satire-à la Mark Twain, as he says-meant to be "'so negative, so offensive, so racist'" that he would offend his boss, Thomas Dunwitty (Michael Rapaport), and put an end to the job he has grown to hate.
41 But his boss (whose office is decorated with African art, Afro- 43. The bank in fact has several different instantiations (all associated with two patents): in some cases there is additional mechanical action (the ears also move); in some the figure is differently specified (Uncle Tom, Sambo, and so on); and in some it is differently gendered (Dinah). Other well-known racist banks (patented in the 1870s and 1880s) include I Always Did American folk art, and photographs of iconic black athletes) loves the show, the network loves the show, and audiences "'turning out by the millions'" love the show. Delacroix continues to insist that his new mode of entertainment has a social message, that his aim is to "'destroy these stereotypes.'" Instead, he has licensed the public to forego its political correctness and to embrace those stereotypes-first anxiously, then gleefully-all over again.He is caught between, on the one hand, a conscience that recognizes the mass cultural horror he has loosed upon the world and, on the other, the financial, artistic, award-winning success that accompanies his new TV hit (B).
In the midst of this success, his unambivalent female assistant and onetime lover, Sloan Hopkins (Jada Pinkett Smith), presents Delacroix with a satiric gift, a "'Jolly Nigger Bank,'" not a "'repro,'" as she says, but "'circa turn-of-century.'" "'I love these black collectibles,'" she goes on to say: "'It reminds me of a time of our history in this country when we were considered inferior, subhuman, and we should never forget'" (B). The bank is meant to snap him out of his reverie, to refocus his attention on the tragic and grotesque history of black caricatures, and to put a stop to the show; it is meant, no less, to provoke him into recognizing his self-humiliating greed.
To perform this feat, Sloan chooses the most notorious-and most widely produced and purchased-of the iron bust banks, the operation of which is simple: after a coin is placed in the outstretched hand of the character, and after the lever at the back of the bank is depressed, his arm lifts and his hand drops the coin in his mouth as his tongue recedes, and his eyes roll backward. The humor of the mechanical bank industry depended on circulating such caricatures, easily aligned with minstrelsy.
42 The caricaturing did not focus exclusively on African Americans: Paddy and His Pig depicts an Irishman, astraddle a large hog, who's willing to lick a penny from the animal's snout; the operation of the Reclining Chinaman exposes the four aces stealthily held in his poker hand (figs. 3-6). The great majority of the caricaturing, though, exploited black stereotypes, depicting a wide range of cartoonish incidents.
'Spise a Mule, Darktown Battery, and Darkey and Watermelon. The minstrel cast from Bamboozled includes familiar stereotypes: Sambo, Aunt Jemima, Pickaninny, and so on.
44. The banks were eventually made in aluminum. 45. See F. H. Griffith, "Mechanical Bank Ramblings" (1962), MBCA scrapbook. Griffith wrote a monthly article, including this one, for Hobbies magazine for more than three decades.
The manufacture of the mechanical cast-iron banks began just after the Civil War; the first patent was taken out in 1869; and they enjoyed their widest popularity in the 1880s and 1890s, although they continued to be manufactured until the second world war depleted the supply of iron.
44 The J. & E. Stevens Company (Cromwell, Connecticut), a foundry that had specialized in hardware, both inaugurated the (manual) mass production of the banks and commanded the field, which was extensive; there were manufacturers in Trenton, Baltimore, Chicago, and Philadelphia, among other cities, and the banks sold through the pages of Sears and Roebuck and Marshall Field's catalogs in the 1890s. By the turn of the century, the banks had become part of middle-class daily life. Although England served as an export market for J. & E. Stevens, the U.S. imported few English banks, despite the fact that English manufacturers (especially Starkies) and French manufacturers made considerable use of American themes, including their own versions of the Jolly Nigger bank.
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In the 1930s and 1940s, the banks were still relished for the pedagogical work they supposedly once performed. "Many a child," one commentator wrote, "would put his pennies in a bank that afforded him the amusement of seeing a mule kick his master, or an elephant lift a small negro boy from the ground. This same child would not be easily persuaded to save his pennies from a sense of duty, but once started, the saving habit grew."
46 Another insisted that "these so-called Penny Banks really did more toward instilling the idea of thrift in the mind of the youngster than any other one idea of the time, and many financiers can look back and attribute part of their first ideas of thrift and economy to the Mechanical Bank of their childhood days."
47 Call it the material culturalist's version of the Weber thesis, where the black caricature has been deployed on behalf of saving. In contrast, you could argue no less persuasively that the practice of childhood thrift, mediated by the banks, instilled a demeaning racism-naturalizing adult myths, as Barthes would contend about toys, before the child could think about them.
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The Jolly Nigger bank was understood as the materialization of an actual practice-catching coins in the mouth-that Herman Melville, for one, portrays in the third chapter of The Confidence-Man (1857). "Not the least attractive object" on the Mississippi steamboat, the narrator explains, "was a grotesque negro cripple, in tow-cloth attire and an old coal-sifter of a tambourine in his hand, who, owing to something wrong about his legs, was, in effect, cut down to the stature of a Newfoundland dog." By "making music, such as it was" and "raising mirth," he attracts a crowd for whom he becomes "a singular temptation at once to diversion and charity": for "now and then he would pause, throwing back his head and opening his mouth like an elephant for tossed apples at a menagerie," at which point "people would have a bout at a strange sort of pitch-penny game, the cripple's mouth being at once target and purse, and he hailing each expertlycaught copper with a cracked bravura from his tambourine." The name of the crippled beggar-"'Der Black Guinea dey calls me, sar'"-not only fuses person and thing (which, once the reader discovers his identity as the novel's eponymous character, might be said to mark him as circulating counterfeit coin).
49 It also evokes the object-narratives of the eighteenth century, many of which (say Charles Johnstone's Chrysal; Or, The Adventures of a Guinea [1765]) appeared as biographies or autobiographies of specie. Published on the heels of the English consumer economy's expansion, the autobiographies (of a coach, a rupee, a banknote, shoes, a pen, and so (Dublin, 1782) 51 To the degree that, as Lamb points out, "slave narratives closely follow the narrative pattern laid down by things," 52 we should add, to Kopytoff 's demonstration of how the slave narratives exemplify the life of objects outside the commodity structure, that some of those narratives themselves seem to inhabit the genre of the object autobiography. "You know," the preface reads, in The Adventures of a Rupee (1782), that "the limits of taste are not precisely ascertained-this will make you diffident in deciding on my merit. . . . By you I will be judged who have natural taste with acquired knowledge; whose commerce with mankind has not destroyed every sense of benevolence for your fellow-creatures."
Helenus Scott, The Adventures of a Rupee
53 The kind of mechanical bank that Sloan gives to Delacroix might be said to compress that literary history within a single object. Indeed, Kenneth Goings hints at such compression in the preface to his book on black collectibles: "I have personified these collectibles, and in doing so I earnestly tried to listen to the stories that Aunt Jemima and Uncle Mose and their kin told me." 54 Goings's cultural analysis, in other words, aspires to the generic status of the object autobiography.
Less remotely, though, Sloan means to provoke the kind of outrage that Ralph Ellison depicts in Invisible Man:
Then near the door [of the boarding house] I saw something which I'd never noticed there before: The cast-iron figure of a very black, redlipped and wide-mouthed Negro, whose white eyes stared up at me from the floor, his face an enormous grin, his single large black hand palm up before his chest. It was a bank, a piece of early Americana. . . . For a second I stopped, feeling hate charging within me, then dashed over and grabbed it, suddenly . . . enraged by the tolerance or lack of discrimination, or whatever, that allowed Mary [the house proprietor] to keep such a self-mocking image around. 52. Lamb, "Modern Metamorphoses and Disgraceful Tales," p. 218.
56.
See "Audio Commentary with Director Spike Lee," in Bamboozled. 57. For a personal account of this collecting aspiration, see David Pilgrim, "The Garbage Man: Why I Collect Racist Objects." Pilgrim is the founder and current curator of the Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia at Ferris State University (Grand Rapids, Michigan). His essay, information about the museum, and images from the collection can be viewed at the museum website: http://www.ferris.edu/htmls/news/jimcrow/collect.Lee's own collection appears as well in Judy's kitchen collection in Girl 6 (1996).
58. See Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects, trans. James Benedict (London, 1996), p. 91.
In a fit of anger, he breaks the bank against a pipe, the iron head crumbling and flying apart in his hand, coins flying over the room like crickets. "I kneeled, picking up a piece of the bank, a part of the red-shirted chest, reading the legend FEED ME in a curve of white iron letters. . . . The figure had gone to pieces like a grenade, scattering jagged fragments of painted iron among the coins. I looked at my hand; a small trickle of blood showed." But unlike Ellison's protagonist, Delacroix experiences no such rage. And he not only becomes more obsessively involved in the success of the show but he no less obsessively begins to accumulate Sambo art, his office filling up with antiques: Aunt Jemima cookie jars, Jocko hitching posts, canisters, salt and pepper shakers, and so on. By doing so, he mimics famous contemporary black Americans-Oprah Winfrey, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Magic Johnson, Spike Lee himself, who kept the bank and an Aunt Jemima cookie jar on his desk while he worked on the film. 56 The psychology of this particular collecting impulse has itself been the topic of speculation and debate.
57 Kopytoff's analysis enables us to speculate that the point here is to decommodify the collectibles and to assert semiotic control over this concrete record of the production and distribution of black stereotypes-now representing not African Americans but U.S. racism. Whereas Baudrillard insists that the "magic" of collection is that collecting always amounts to collecting the self, 58 in this case we can imagine collecting, in concert with Sloan, as a memorializing act, marking "a time of our history in this country when we were considered inferior, subhuman," but also manifesting one's distance from that history. But in Delacroix's case, as his office shelves mysteriously become ever more stuffed with this Americana, he seems to have little relation to the collection-less a collection, it seems, than a self-predicating accumulation.
But the camera itself establishes an increasingly intense relationship to the objects, providing both close-ups of individual figures and slow pan shots that grant the objects an eerie life of their own. Shot on high-definition digital tape with handheld cameras, the film provides multiple angles in a consistently high resolution. The cinematography effects the kind of "film magic" that Vachel Lindsay, in the early years of film, associated with the capacity of the medium to enliven the inanimate object-world: "while the actors tend to become types and hieroglyphics and dolls, on the other hand, 61. Cumulatively, the objects demand a kind of pathos not unlike William Kentridge's Shadow Procession (VHS, 1999) of beleaguered anthropomorphic objects that migrate over and over again across a blank landscape that is at once South Africa and no more than a white screen. In both instances, the objects elicit an especially strong emotional response because they so readily disclose the status of the evoked subjects as objects.
Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African (1789), in
The Classic Slave Narratives, p. 39. dolls and hieroglyphics and mechanisms tend to become human."
59 Jean Epstein called this magic photogenie: "Those lives it creates, by summoning objects out of the shadows of indifference into the light of dramatic concern, have little in common with human life. These lives are like the life in charms and amulets, the ominous, tabooed objects of certain primitive religions."
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In the case of the black collectibles, of course, their cinematic animation has every thing to do with human life, with human lives, which is why their smiling sadness seems to haunt the story so ominously, lined up and packed into the shelves, reflecting not so much the commodity's life, standing in some shop, but life on the middle passage.
61 The collectibles become a mute chorus, sitting in judgment and pained by the recapitulation of the history they're witnessing in the new millennium.
But even if the cinematography effects an aura of animation-scenes in which the objects stare back, in which the objects stare past (or all but stare through) the characters to establish contact with the cinematic spectatorBamboozled goes on to literalize the animation. The establishing shot for the moment of psychological transition-after Delacroix, chastised by a phone call from his mother, finally begins to face up to the ramifications of his unanticipated success-provides a view from the floor of the ominously shadowed objects that now crowd the room. At his desk, Delacroix desultorily deposits a few coins in the bank, working its mechanical hand. Then the bank works itself. In a voice-over we hear: "When I thought or imagined that my favorite Jolly Nigger bank, an inanimate object, a piece of cold cast iron, was moving by itself, I knew I was getting paranoid" (B) (figs. 7-8). Such paranoia derives from the apprehension that the animate object may be a witness to some crime; when Equiano first arrives in Virginia, "the first object that engaged [his] attention was a watch, which hung on the chimney, and was going. I was quite surprised at the noise it made, and was afraid it would tell the gentleman any thing I might do amiss."
62 In Bamboozled, the jump cut from the office scene to a close-up of the blacked-up face of a new minstrel star intensifies the object/subject equation; it also intimates that the collectibles have some preternatural access to events beyond the confines of Delacroix's office.
As the film draws to a close, Delacroix's dreamlike success erupts into a nightmare. Enraged anarchists publicly execute the star of his show. The bank returns to life. Delacroix crumbles in a fit of despair and frustration, soon to be shot himself, by Sloan. In his despair, blacked-up, he cradles his bank-at once an emblem of his greed and of the degradation he himself has perpetuated. The film rehearses the ways in which capitalism continually offers up examples of sudden rises and falls, of the animation of things and the deanimation of humans. But, above all, I want to understand this revenge of the black collectible come-to-life as the recollection of the ontological scandal perpetrated by slavery, as the reanimation of the reified black body: not some literalization of the commodity fetish, but the reenactment of the breakdown of the person/thing binary, a compressed filmic figure that encapsulates a long biography of things-the "relentless objectification" that reappears as the personification of objects.
63 Such reanimation constitutes the American uncanny.
The Uncanny
Freud can be read using the term uncanny as a rather casual synonym for fearful, describing something that bears "some relation to danger."
64 But of course his 1919 essay on the topic has become the locus classicus for apprehending a more highly specified kind of dread. In particular he was concerned to move beyond one claim made by Ernst Jentsch-who, in "Zur Psycholgie des Unheimlichen," had ascribed the essential factor in the production of the feeling of uncanniness to intellectual uncertainty, an especially good instance of which is those "doubts whether an apparently animate being is in fact alive; or, conversely, whether a lifeless object might not in fact be animate." He mentions E. T. A. Hoffmann's tales and describes the way that wax figures, dolls, and life-size automata are especially prone to provoke the emotion of uncanniness. "A particularly favorable condition for awakening uncanny sensations," he writes, "is created when there is intellectual uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, and when an inanimate object becomes too much like an animate one," and he points out how regularly literature uses this device to "invoke the origin of the uncanny mood in the reader."
66. Freud, "The Uncanny" (1919) For Freud, routing an argument both through etymology and through his own reading of Hoffmann, the essential aspect of the uncanny is, first, the degree to which the unfamiliar is suddenly disclosed as the familiar. Famously: das unheimliche is das heimliche. The uncanny is "nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression." He quotes Schelling, for whom the uncanny names that which "ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light"-in other (psychoanalytic) words, the return of the repressed. And, for Freud, reading The Sandman as an oedipal drama, focusing on the eyes of Olympia (the automaton) and her creator's destruction of them, what gets repressed (and symptomatically expressed by the uncanny) is the threat of castration.
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Freud's essay has become one of those celebrated sites in psychoanalysis that attract extensive commentary, within which Jentsch has suffered the fate of being most familiar as a dismissive footnote.
67 Even Stanley Cavell, mentioning Freud's reference to "an article from 1906 by a certain Jentsch," working to preserve uncanniness from the hegemony of the Oedipus and to refocus attention on "the recognition of an uncertainty in our ability to distinguish the animate from the inanimate," does not return to Jentsch's essay and its interest in the inanimate object-world. Hardly concerned with dolls or automata, Cavell draws attention to "the sense of the human as inherently strange, say unstable, its quotidian as forever fantastic." The uncanny emerges from an individual's confrontation with the otherness/sameness of others, with the other's "automatonity" that "shows itself as a form of the skeptical problem concerning the existence of (what Anglo-American philosophy calls) other minds." Thus, while Cavell intriguingly points out how symptomatically Freud repudiates Jentsch "no fewer than four times," a denial he takes "to be itself uncanny," he never speculates that the repression at work may be the repression of the unhuman object-world itself, which psychoanalysis compulsively translates into the human.
68 The Interpretation of Dreams, like The Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, may be chock full of objects, but each is a symbol for the human body, in whole or in parts.
69 Indeed, you might say that the degree to which psycho- analysis translates the unhuman into the human is the degree to which uncanniness appears as the objective of psychoanalysis itself. Which is precisely why psychoanalysis can hardly begin to explain the uncanny, ontological ambiguity of objects like the mesmerizing, haunting Egyptian coffin mask of the Roman period (FM no. 4823) that was one of more than three thousand objects in Freud's collection of antiquities. While Freud quietly dismissed the importance of the collection, Lacan did so shrilly.
70 Here, I simply want to reassert the specificity of Jenstch's interest in the ambiguously animate object and to imagine that uncanniness can be precipitated by cultural history precisely because law, politics, and ideology so patently contribute to untoward and ambiguous ontologies, to the riddle of person or thing. As I've tried to suggest, for U.S. law the slave becomes the source of uncanny anxiety.
The animation of the lifeless object, in the case of the black collectible, reinstates Jentsch's argument, fully leavened by part of Freud's. For the point is not only that the inanimate comes to life but that the history of this ontological ambiguity-human or thing-is precisely what remains repressed within U.S. culture (or symptomatically expressed, say, in the law's contradiction). The point isn't just that the coming-to-life-of-the-black-object within Bamboozled is an expression of this uncanniness. Rather, in what one might call the material unconscious of the film, we can apprehend the uncanniness of the mechanical bank itself-the very ontological instabilityexpressed by the artifact itself, the oscillation between animate and inanimate, subject and object, human and thing, that has no doubt made it such an iconic emblem of racism within American material culture, that has made it the most despised and most prized object of black memorabilia, simultaneously the object of repulsion and fascination.
The history of this uncanniness unsurprisingly plunges us back into the nineteenth century, as does the imbrication of minstrelsy and so-called Sambo art. In "The Mantle-Piece Minstrels," a story published by John Kendrick Bangs in 1896, Jimmieboy witnesses the fortnightly meeting of the Toy Club, where the objects on a mantel put on a minstrel show. look like darkies, the clock in the middle looking for all the world like the middleman at the regular minstrels, and at the ends were the grotesque little Chinese god holding clappers in his hands and the dragonhandled Royal Worcester jar holding a tambourine. Between these two were ranged the antique silver match-box Jimmieboy's papa had bought in Italy, the Delft cat, three or four small vases, a sandstone statuette dug up from some old ruined temple in Cyprus, and various other rare objects of art which Jimmieboy Senior was very fond of.
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The point here, of course, is that for these objects to come to life, for them to violate their status as mere things, they must black up, they must perform within, or as, the ontological ambiguity expressed by minstrelsy itself.
In contrast, objects assume life in Charles Chesnutt's fiction in the mode of, say, residual enchantment-the sort of "animism" he traced back to "African fetishism," back to the life of things beyond commodity culture.
72 "Po' Sandy" tells the story of a slave whose wife, a conjurer, transforms him into a pine tree in order to prevent him from being shuttled between plantations. When the tree is chopped down, the milled boards are used to construct a kitchen where the other slaves keep "'hear[in] sump'n moanin' en groanin' . . . in de night-time, en w'en de win' would blow dey could hear sump'n a holler'in en sweekin' lack it wuz in great pain en sufferin.' '" Rendered useless by being "ha'nted," the kitchen is torn down, the boards used to build a schoolhouse.
73 By telling the story-and intimating that the wood remains alive with Sandy's spirit-Uncle Julius prevents the new owner from tearing down the schoolhouse to make new use of the lumber. Instead, Julius makes use of it to house the meeting for the Colored Baptist Church. Insofar as such a tale reports the power of animism (actual or fabricated) to interrupt the northern appropriation of southern property, it would seem to tell the story-even as Chesnutt dramatizes the literal reification endured by slaves-of how the animate object-world can interrupt human action.
For a very different example from the nineteenth century, I'd like to turn to some Twainian satire, to the pages of The Gilded Age, which he published with Charles Dudley Warner in 1873. This rollicking tale of speculation and corruption also contains an uncanny scene of gothic proportions. Ruth Bolton, determined to buck her Quaker family and to study medicine, attends the Woman's Medical College in Philadelphia, where, like anyone in her trade, she begins "her anatomical practice upon detached portions of the human frame," that is, on cadaverous body parts. As the narrator puts it, remarking on the nursing work women did among the "scenes of carnage" during "the late war," "custom inures the most sensitive persons to that which is at first most repellant." But the uncustomary can reassert itself within any custom. To complete her studies, one night she must return to the dissecting room of the college. She brings a friend, and the two girls, candles in hand, climb the stairs to where, as the janitor has told them, "'there's a new one.'" They approach the long table in the middle of the room, and Ruth tentatively lifts the sheet.
Both the girls started. It was a negro. The black face seemed to defy the pallor of death, and asserted an ugly life-likeness that was frightful. . . . Perhaps it was the wavering light of the candles, perhaps it was only the agony from a death of pain, but the repulsive black face seemed to wear a scowl that said, "Haven't you yet done with the outcast, persecuted black man, but you must now haul him from his grave, and send even your women to dismember his body?"
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This is the example with which Jentsch closes his essay-"the horror which a dead body" causes, the horror provoked by those "thoughts of latent animatedness [that] always lie so close to those things." 75 In The Gilded Age, the narrator adds a scolding commentary: "Who is this dead man, one of thousands who died yesterday, and will be dust anon, to protest that science shall not turn his worthless carcass into some account."
76 But of course, as with the animate bank that torments Delacroix in Bamboozled, this act of reanimation congeals a history with which it confronts the rattled young woman. The startling, unfamiliar event in the novel discloses the horror of the familiar. Different as these examples are, they uncannily reproduce an uncanny effect that has its roots in the condition of slavery itself, in the repressed fact of the ontological ambiguity that U.S. slavery sustained.
The Matter of Modernism
Modernism may be most familiar-in Joyce or Woolf, as in Braque and Picasso-as the story of the psychological or apperceiving subject. But it is no less the story of objects: an insistence, voiced by both Pessoa and Williams, on returning to things; the surrealists' objets trouvés; Duchamp's Fountain and Meret Oppenheim's fur cup; and Benjamin's fascination with kitsch. In the case of Invisible Man, the scene of the smashed bank is simply one episode within Ellison's elaborate organization of both plot and character as a series of object-relations, beginning with the narrator's disgust at the eviction he witnesses during his first day in Harlem, the scene of dispossession, with the "clutter of household objects" strewn on the sidewalk. "This junk, these shabby chairs, these heavy, old-fashioned pressing irons, zinc wash tubs with dented bottoms-all throbbed within me with more meaning than there should have been" (IM, pp. 205, 207) . This excess of meaning gets discharged in the extemporaneous speech he delivers in the street, drawing a crowd and the attention of the Brotherhood. Within the Brotherhood, Brother Trap gives him an object similarly saturated with significance-"'a kind of luck piece,'" an "oily piece of filed steel that had been twisted open and forced partly back into place," a chain link that serves as a memento of the nineteen years that Trap spent as a prisoner in the South. "'I think it's got a heap of signifying wrapped up in it,'" Trap explains as he gives the "'keepsake'" to his fellow Brother; "'it might help you remember what we're really fighting against'" (IM, p. 293). Preserving the object in his front pocket, the Invisible Man can keep the cause proximate while providing himself with a weapon. By the end of the novel, the keepsake shares space with another object, one of the paper dolls he picks up on 43
rd Street, one of the dolls that seems to precipitate the final turning point of the action, a thing for which the Invisible Man "fe[els] a hatred as for something alive" (IM, p. 336).
When he's downtown, he spots Clifton across the street, a Brother who's been missing and who, it turns out, has become an apostate from the Brotherhood. He has become a vendor, selling dancing Sambo dolls: I'd seen nothing like it before. A grinning doll of orange-and-black tissue paper with thin flat cardboard disks forming its head and feet and which some mysterious mechanism was causing to move up and down in a loose-jointed, shoulder-shaking, infuriatingly sensuous motion, a dance that was completely detached from the black, mask-like face. . . .
[The] doll [was] throwing itself about with the fierce defiance of someone performing a degrading act in public, dancing as though it received a perverse pleasure from its motions. [IM, p. 326] "Beneath the chuckles of the crowd," the Invisible Man can hear Clifton's accompanying "spiel": "Shake him, shake him, you cannot break him. For he's Sambo, the dancing, Sambo, the prancing, Sambo, the entrancing, Sambo Boogie Woogie paper doll" (IM, p. 326). He simply stares, "held by the inanimate, boneless bouncing of the grinning doll and struggl[ing] between 77. The appeal of the 1951 South Carolina case was combined by the Supreme Court with other school segregation cases under the umbrella Brown v. Board of Education. Just as Kenneth Clark had testified before the three-judge federal panel in South Carolina, so too he presented his research to the Warren court. The Clarks tested the sensitivity of black children to racial discrimination by presenting each child with identically formed dolls, one black and one white, and asking which was good or bad, which was a preferable toy, and which looked like the child. In both his original research (on more than two hundred children) and in his local research for the case, a considerable majority of the black children preferred the white doll. the desire to join in the laughter and to leap upon it with both feet" (IM, p. 326). On the one hand, the dance of the doll recapitulates prior, dehumanizing episodes in the novel: when the protagonist, one of the black boys turned into toys, frantically lunges for coins on an electrified rug ("My muscles jumped, my nerves jangled, writhed" [IM, p. 22]); and when, on the verge of death, he has to endure shock therapy: "The pulse came swift and staccato, increasing gradually until I fairly danced between the nodes." At this point he overhears bits of a conversation: "'Look he's dancing,'" "'They really do have rhythm, don't they?'" (IM, pp. 180-81). The Invisible Man himself has endured a kind of ontological ambiguity. But, on the other hand and above all, on 43 rd Street, he is shocked that a former Brother could have descended into caricature mongering.
The year before Invisible Man appeared, a very different doll had become integral to the discussion of race relations in the U.S. Kenneth and Mamie Clark's study of black children (ages six to nine) disidentifying with black dolls was presented as psychological evidence, in Briggs v. Elliot, of the devastating psychological effects of the discrimination perpetrated by segregated schooling. 77 The study depended on an axiomatic understanding of how objects contribute to the animation of a self-image. One might speculate, beyond the confines of their study, that this disavowal of the black doll (however benign and realistic) was precipitated by the perpetuation of black caricatures in the form of dolls, bust banks, toys . . . objects of fun, not subjects in history. Indeed, Ellison's narrator recodes the uncanny as a relation to history, as the indecent persistence of the past in the present. He understands the lapsarian Clifton as having made the choice "to fall outside of history" (IM, p. 328). And after Clifton has been shot and killed, his former Brother continues to think: "Why should a man deliberately plunge outside of history and peddle an obscenity?" (IM, p. 331). That obscenity, which is itself the obscenity of anachronism, goes on to inform his perception of the history he's a part of; he thinks of the Negroes coming down from the train platform as "those of us who shoot up from the South into the busy city like wild jacks-in-the-box broken loose from our springs" (IM, p. 332). In other words, black life in the South is the static life of a windup toy; life in New York provides a kinesthetic alternative and the chance to Pierre Delacroix, however privileged and however emblematic of a new African American class, has become, according to Ellison's scheme, one of the "men outside of historical time" (IM, p. 333), not a man who remembers "a time of our history in this country when we were considered inferior, subhuman" (as Sloan insists), but a man who reenacts that history. Convincing the rappers to black up as minstrels, he has led them to some place "outside, in the dark with Sambo, the dancing paper doll" (IM, p. 333). For the Invisible Man, staring at the doll from his pocket, "the political equivalent of such entertainment is death" (IM, p. 337). The Harvard-educated black man, circulating his own version of "'obscene dolls'" (IM, p. 353), succeeds, then, by commodifying not history, but the plunge outside of history. By telling the story of a televisualized minstrel show succeeding in the new millennium, Spike Lee works to produce a different kind of uncanniness: not ontological ambiguity but historical ambiguity, the incapacity to differentiate the present from the past, despite history, because, despite change over time, there's been no change.
In the "'sho 'nough race riot'" with which the novel concludes, in the "crash of men against things" in Harlem that becomes the "crash of men against men," the Invisible Man runs east in the moonlight along 125 th Street, avoiding the "distorted objects" within the river of glittering, shattered glass (IM, p. 417, 419). He then stops abruptly: "Ahead of me the body hung, white, naked, and horribly feminine from a lamppost . . . and now there was another and another, seven-all hanging before a gutted storefront. . . . They were mannequins-'Dummies!' I said aloud." Their status remains in doubt: "But are they unreal, I thought; are they?" (IM, pp. 419-20). Here it is no longer the black man's body that appears uncanny, but, from the black man's perspective, the white woman's body. It makes some sense to understand the scene as Ellison's effort to stage the coalescence of the exploitation of black men and white women.
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But I want to conclude by emphasizing how, even as the scene records Ellison's experience of the 1943 riot, this scene of the mannequins invokes and refunctions the iconic source of uncanniness within modernity, the mannequins that for Zola, for Eugene Atget, for Aragon, among others, made it clear that modernity was not the experience of disenchantment While elaborating his alternative, surrealist political economy, Georges Bataille made a point about the status of things that has always struck me as especially salient, accounting not least for why today's anthropologists find themselves faced with the need to engage the complex and ambiguous nature of objects. In his account of "The Bourgeois World," in the first volume of The Accursed Share, Bataille writes that "at the origin of industrial society, based on the primacy and autonomy of commodities, of things, we find a contrary impulse to place what is essential-what causes one to tremble with fear and delight-outside the world of activity, the world of things. But however this is shown it does not controvert the fact that in general a capitalist society reduces what is human to the condition of a thing." 82 The priority of the Cartesian or Kantian subject in modern Western thought, the dismissal of object-based epistemology, the declarations about the overthrow of matter-these refusals to accept and address the object-world have been precipitated, Bataille would argue, by the very centrality of that world in and for capitalist culture. But the American uncanny, as I've tried to describe it, might alert us to another dynamic as well: the possibility that our reluctance to think seriously about things may result from a repressed apprehension-the apprehension that within things we will discover the human precisely because our history is one in which humans were reduced to things (however incomplete that reduction).
As the closing credits for Bamboozled roll up the screen, Lee offers an extensive parade of black collectibles in the form of serial close-ups: an array of windup toys (Alabama Coon Jigger, Struttin' Sammy, and so on) along with two banks (Dark Town Battery, Always Did 'Spise a Mule), each shown against a blank, blue backdrop, performing full steam, as Bruce Hornsby sings "Shadowlands" (figs. 9-10). According to Lee himself, the visual catalogue is meant to display the "hatred of the minds that made this stuff."
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But the extraordinary, exhausting sequence registers more than such hatred. Multiply animated-by their own mechanism, by the film, by the musiceach figure, whether gorgeous or grotesque, seems caught, frantically dancing or fiddling, bouncing or swinging, swallowing pitched balls, grinning and smiling, unable to stop. No longer part of that mute chorus witnessing the repetition of history, the individuated objects bespeak a life of things that is no social life, only the hyperactive persistence of the past. 
